(Revised Version)

We all hope so, but at our ages and experience, we know there can be a few individuals involved in election management or facilities management who can be bribed or otherwise motivated to try to tamper with election outcomes.

Only well-implemented, trustworthy election systems  and procedures can effectively block those who might want to tamper with the ballots.

For example, a list of the 27 alleged statute violations by the 2010 Board and Election Committee and currently under investigation by the State of Nevada (Case IS-10-2182) is found in this PDF file:  [1] List of Alleged 2010 SCA Election Violations

To answer the question for SCA in 2011, we need to list some basic features and characteristics of a “trusted” secret ballot process, and compare SCA’s current components to the desired criteria.

1. BALLOT:  The ballot should contain the candidate names printed lightly on card stock so the printing and marked votes are not detectable when reversed and held up to strong light in a dark room.

The ballot should include unique, sequential serial numbers created for that particular election to deter the preparation and casting of counterfeit ballots.

2. INNER ENVELOPE:  The inner envelope should be of the windowless type often used for mailing checks or other confidential material.

The inner envelope would contain internal tinting so the printing and writing on the ballots could not be detected without opening the envelope. The flaps should clearly indicate if there had been attempts to improperly open or tamper with the seals.

It should be impossible to detect anything printed or marked on the enclosed ballot.

3. OUTER ENVELOPE:  The outer envelope should have inner tinting and tamper-resistant flap seals. It should be impossible to detect anything printed or marked on the enclosed inner envelope.

4. BALLOT “LOCK” BOX:  The containers used to store the voted ballots in the Community Centers during the voting period should be “tamper-proof”.

The ballot “lock” box construction should use tamper-proof screws, tamper-proof door locks, and tamper-evident seals around the access door.

The ballots should not be able to be viewed,  removed or accessed at any time of the day or night until counting time.

5. BALLOT HANDLING PROCEDURES:  Ballots are either inserted directly by members into a Ballot Lock Box or sent via US Mail addressed to a reserved USPS mail box. Only the authorized voting member should be able to touch a ballot between the time it is completed and inserted into a Ballot Box.

6. BALLOT HANDLING PROCEDURES RECEIVED VIA US MAIL:  A special USPS Mailbox should be rented for the sole purpose of receiving ballots during the voting period.

Only a limited number of background-cleared individuals should have key access to the USPS box during the voting period.

Ballots should not be removed from the USPS box before they can be taken directly to, and immediately inserted into one of the Ballot Lock Boxes in a Community Center.

7. BALLOT COUNTING PROCESS:  The process of opening the ballot lock boxes and counting the votes should be in plain sight.

All members should be able to pass by and observe the activities from a distance–not to exceed 10 feet.

Once the outer envelopes had been validated as representing members entitled to vote and the ballot had been removed, the outer envelopes should be sorted in street address sequence and made available for inspection by members.

The outer envelopes should be permanently stored in case there was a question about the member validation process.

Board members and candidates should have priority access to reviewing the outer envelopes.

So, how does the SCA 2011 Ballot Handling Process measure up to the “trusted” criteria described above?

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IT FAILS!   None of the SCA Election system components uses any of the trusted criteria.

For example:

1. SCA BALLOT PACKAGE IS VULNERABLE TO TAMPERING.   The SCA ballot and envelopes use the cheapest materials available.

It appears possible to hold up completed/sealed ballots in front of a strong light in a dark room and detect the votes in most, if not all of the ballots.

It appears possible for someone having access to the ballots to destroy some of the ballots cast for certain candidates or groups of individuals. 

The preferred candidates would be certain to win, and the opposed candidates would lose by “reasonable” margins.

The current SCA ballots and election procedures could not detect such tampering and fraud.

2. SCA BALLOT BOX IS VULNERABLE TO TAMPERING.  The SCA ballot boxes are not tamper-resistant.  The construction is of wood with normal screws.

The access door is locked by the cheap type of lock often seen in file cabinets and office desks.

Such locks can be easily picked by a non-expert using techniques readily found on the Internet.

No tamper-resistant/tamper-evident seals are used on the doors, other potential access points, and voting slots to detect unauthorized accesses during late nights and weekends.

No information is provided by the Board on who has restricted access to the ballot box keys or about what kind of 24/7 security/access-prevention is being provided for the ballot boxes.

There are no procedures for detecting and reporting on attempted accesses to the ballots.

After normal hours to avoid being detected, it would be easy for someone to move/wheel the ballot boxes to a more shielded area from the outside and/or remove and inspect ballots via the open slot on top.

3. SCA BALLOT HANDLING PROCESS IS VULNERABLE TO TAMPERING.  Ballots cast via the US Mail appear to be mixed in with regular mail and processed without special handling.

It appears it would not be difficult for employees or volunteer members to gain unsupervised access to the ballots received by mail and to the “extra ballots” made available for members who might need them.

In addition, copies of extra or reproduced ballots can be voted by unauthorized individuals–with little chance of being detected.

An individual may also be able to (a) remove and destroy ballots from the ballot boxes, (b) to cast counterfeit ballots for likely non-voting units (such as rentals or units for sale or for rent), and/or to (c) tamper in other ways with the contents prior to placing seemingly valid ballots into a ballot lock box.

None of that kind of illegal activity is likely to be detected by the current SCA election procedures.

With so few effective security elements and procedures, how COULD the SCA election process be considered “trustworthy”?

The current SCA system is so loose it can not provide any hard evidence of ballot tampering, destruction, or counterfeit submissions, and the “certified” results can not be audited by a 3rd party individual.

So, we must argue it is important to recognize the serious weaknesses in the system and for members to demand they be corrected in the future.

We believe the SCA Board of Directors and Election Committee should care deeply about being vulnerable to suspicions and mistrust by candidates and community members.

Even if no one is discovered taking improper or unfair advantage of the election system, it must always be implemented so that it at least appears to be open, fair, secure and above reproach.  Such capabilities are the foundations of our American Constitution and culture.

SCA Boards and EC members have done little in the past to try to protect the association from allegations of unfair elections.

And, the fact that the board’s preferred candidates have won every open seat for over 3 years is sufficient cause to worry about the integrity of our election system.

We believe a board majority that truly cared about election trustworthiness could repair all of the election  system vulnerabilities in just a few short weeks, at low cost, and permanently ensure that everyone can have pride and high confidence in our election process.

Regardless of the 2011 election outcome, please help us to demand that board action be taken to provide SCA with “trustworthy” elections in the future. 

Our future in hanging on providing open, honest and fair board elections in the future.